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Do Old Laws Cover New Technologies?
Dorothy Higdon Murphy1
I. Introduction
Considerable litigation continues to surround the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act2 ("ECPA") as courts struggle to
develop an understanding of how the ECPA will accommodate
advances in computer technology, namely electronic
communication. The ECPA, enacted by Congress in 1986,
consists of two titles. Title I, commonly referred to as the Wiretap
Act, pertains to the interception of wire, oral, and electronic
communications.4 Title II, commonly referred to as the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"), applies to stored wire and
electronic communication.
5
Great emphasis is placed on the language of the Wiretap
Act. Courts draw a distinction between "wire communication"
6
and "electronic communication ' 7 because the definition of wire
communication includes "electronic storage" 8 while the definition
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006.
2 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
3 This Comment will focus on email, a form of electronic communication. As
Henry Ford II stated, "[t]he economic and technological triumphs of the past
few years have not solved as many problems as we thought they would, and, in
fact, have brought us new problems we did not foresee." Quote from Henry
Ford II, in THE NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS AND FAMOUS
PHRASES, at 233 (Donald 0. Bolander ed., 1987).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
5 Id. §§ 2701-2711.
6 Id. § 2510(1).
7 Id. § 2510(12).
8 Id. § 2510(17) (defining "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by
an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication").
of electronic communication does not.9 This distinction is
significant in determining if and when electronic communication
may be "intercepted."' 0 Courts have interpreted this distinction to
mean that electronic communication that is in electronic storage
cannot be intercepted under the Wiretap Act." The problem in
applying the statute is that "[t]echnology has, to some extent,
overtaken language. Traveling the [I]nternet, electronic
communications are often-perhaps constantly-both 'in transit'
and 'in storage' simultaneously, a linguistic but not a technological
paradox."'
12
In United States v. Councilman,13 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the complex issue of when the Wiretap Act
protects electronic communication. In a split decision, the First
Circuit upheld the district court ruling, holding that an Internet
service provider ("ISP") does not violate criminal wiretap laws
when it copies and reads customers' email messages without their
consent.14 The First Circuit reasoned that the intercept provisions
of the Wiretap Act did not apply due to the fact that the messages
9 In 2001, in a provision of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA
PATRIOT Act"), Congress amended the definition of "wire communication" to
exclude stored communications. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). Despite this amendment, confusion remains
regarding the interpretation of the Wiretap Act. See discussion infra Part III.B.
All references made in this Comment are to the statute prior to amendment,
unless otherwise noted.
10 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (defining "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device").
"See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003) (holding that the unauthorized acquisition of the
contents of a secure, private website does not constitute an "intercept" under the
Wiretap Act because the electronic communication was in electronic storage);
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that obtaining unread email messages from an electronic bulletin
board does not constitute an "intercept" under the Wiretap Act because the email
messages were in electronic storage).
12 United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003).
'3 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
14 id
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were held in electronic storage. 15 As of October 5, 2004, a
majority of the First Circuit judges voted to withdraw and vacate
their prior judgment and rehear the case en banc.16
This Comment examines the First Circuit's decision in
Councilman and argues that the court incorrectly interpreted and
applied settled law to the unique facts of the case, thereby
impermissibly allowing electronic communications that are
characterized simultaneously as "in transit" and "in storage" to be
acquired by ISPs without violating either the Wiretap Act or the
SCA.17 This Comment proposes that in rehearing the case, the
court should avoid a narrow construction of the Wiretap Act
because such an interpretation leads to outcomes that are contrary
to public policy. Furthermore, in rehearing the case, the court
should construe the ECPA as a whole statute, not as two separate
titles.
Parts I and II of this Comment examine the statutory
background for the discussion. Part I provides an overview of the
precursor to the ECPA, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,18 and briefly outlines the historical events
leading up to the enactment of the ECPA of 1986. Part II
summarizes the amendments made to the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by the ECPA of 1986.
Part III of this Comment discusses the Wiretap Act as it
relates to interception of electronic communications. This Part
considers the flawed reasoning the First Circuit employed in
Councilman to determine that the defendant did not "intercept" 19
electronic communications in violation of the Wiretap Act when
software, installed at his request, allowed him to intentionally copy
and read his customers' private email in order to gain a
15 Id.
16 United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793, withdrawing and vacating 373
F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
17 It is questionable whether the defendant would qualify for the provider
exception under 18 U.S.C. § 270 1(c)(1) of the SCA. See infra text
accompanying note 123.
18 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, tit. III, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522).
19 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000).
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competitive advantage. This Part further argues that the First
Circuit is correct in rehearing Councilman20 en banc because the
panel misinterpreted and incorrectly applied settled case law to the
unique facts of this case.
Part IV of this Comment examines the issues that the First
Circuit should address when rehearing Councilman. First, this Part
discusses whether the language of the Wiretap Act is ambiguous.
Next, this Part explores those issues the court requested that the
parties address: (1) "[w]hether the conduct at issue in this case
could have been additionally, or alternatively, prosecuted under the
Stored Communications Act"21 and (2) "[w]hether the rule of
lenity precludes prosecution in this case. 22 In particular, this Part
examines the SCA as it relates to stored electronic
communications.
Part V of this Comment discusses the negative implications
of the First Circuit's narrow reading of the Wiretap Act when read
in conjunction with the SCA. This Part proposes that courts should
take measures necessary to prevent electronic communications
from being acquired by ISPs without consequence, under either the
Wiretap Act or the SCA. Namely, courts should examine both
titles of the ECPA concurrently and implement a test to determine
which title of the ECPA is applicable to the electronic
communication at issue.
II. Prior to the Enactment of the ECPA: The Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
20 Councilman, 385 F.3d 793, withdrawing and vacating 373 F.3d 197 (1 st Cir.
2004).
21 Id. Note that the defendant in Councilman, relying on the provider exceptions
in 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (c)(1), made the argument that his conduct was lawful under
the SCA and was therefore outside the scope of the Wiretap Act. The First
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Streets Act, the precursor to the ECPA, in 1968.23 Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was commonly
referred to as the Federal Wiretap Act. The purpose of the Federal
Wiretap Act was to "prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil
penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire communications,
except those specifically provided for in the Act, most notably
those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers when
authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of
[certain] serious crimes."24 These restrictions were intended to
protect the important government interest in privacy of
communication, "thereby encouraging the uninhibited exchange of
ideas and information among private parties." 25 The Federal
Wiretap Act was limited in that it only addressed the interception
of wire and oral communications.26 Prior to the enactment of the
ECPA, courts interpreted "intercept" to mean the acq2uisition of a
communication contemporaneous with transmission.
In 1984, Senator Leahy wrote to the Attorney General
inquiring as to whether electronic communications were covered
by the Federal Wiretap Act.2 8 The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
responded by stating that electronic communications are protected
from acquisition "only where a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists.,,29 The DOJ further noted that "in this rapidly developing
area of communications which range from cellular non-wire
23 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, tit. III, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522).
24 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974); see also Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153, 2153).
25 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (quoting the Brief for the
United States).
26 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, tit. III, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522).
27 United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an
intercept did not occur when police obtained and played back a tape of a
telephone call that was previously recorded by a third party). This was the first
case to introduce the narrow interpretation of the term "intercept."28 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558.
29 id.
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telephone connections to microwave-fed computer terminals,
distinctions [whether there does or does not exist a reasonable
expectation of privacy] are not always clear or obvious." 30
On September 19, 1985, Senators Leahy and Mathias,
dissatisfied with the DOJ's response, introduced a bill for the
ECPA of 1985. 31 Pursuant to Congress's order, the Office of
Technology Assessment conducted a study in which they
concluded that the legal protections for email in 1985 were "weak,
ambiguous, or non-existent," and "electronic mail remain[ed]
legally as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized
surveillance. 32 Following a hearing conducted by the
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, a new bill
superseded the ECPA of 1985 in order to reflect concerns raised by
the Subcommittee.33 On June 19, 1986, Senators Leahy and
Mathias introduced the new bill, stating that the existing law is
"hopelessly out of date" 34 and has failed to keep up with
developments in computer technology. After reviewing the bill,
the Subcommittee amended it to clarify certain provisions. In a
unanimous vote, the Subcommittee sent a favorable report on the
ECPA of 1986, as amended, to the full Senate.35
III. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
Amends the Federal Wiretap Act
In 1986, Congress enacted the ECPA in order to update and
expand the privacy protections in the 1968 Federal Wiretap Act.36
30 Id. (citing Oversight on Communications Privacy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1985)).
31 id.
32 Id. (citing OFFICE OF TECH. AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONG. FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1985)).
13 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558.
34 132 CONG. REC. S7991, daily ed. (June 19, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
3 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5.36 Id. at 1; see also Electronic Privacy Information Center, United States v.
Councilman, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/councilman/ (Nov. 17, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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The purpose of the ECPA is to "protect against the unauthorized
interception of electronic communications... [and to] update and
clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications
technologies." 3 The Subcommittee recognized that computers
were used extensively to store and process information and that the
"law must advance with the technology to ensure the continued
vitality of the fourth amendment." 38
Prior to the enactment of the ECPA, the Federal Wiretap Act
only protected wire and oral communications. The ECPA made a
number of changes. 39 It amended (1) the definition of "wire
communications" to include wire communications in "electronic-
storage," such as voicemail; 40 (2) the definition of "intercept" to
cover "electronic communications;" (3) the variety of acts
constituting interception from "aural acquisitions" to "aural or
other acquisition;" (4) the definitions to include the terms
"electronic communication," "electronic communications system,"
"electronic communication service," and "electronic storage;" and
(5) the statute to provide that inadvertent interceptions were
deemed not to be crimes under the ECPA.4 1
The ECPA prohibits the intentional interception of wire,
electronic, and oral communications.42 Moreover, the legislative
history of the ECPA suggests that Congress sought to protect
private electronic communications such as email.43
37 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1.38 Id. at 5.
39 Due to the breadth of this legislation, this Comment only addresses those
amendments relevant to the focus of this discussion.
40 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 210 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Congress
included electronic storage in its definition of wire communications because it
wanted voicemails to be protected under the Wiretap Act after those messages
were delivered.").
41 The Electronic Communication and Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
42 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (2000).
4'S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
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IV. Title I of the ECPA: The Wiretap Act
A. Statutory Language and Interpretation
The Wiretap Act addresses the interception of wire, oral,
and electronic communications. 44 Subject to certain exceptions, a
criminal or civil cause of action under the Wiretap Act exists
against any person who:
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures
any other person to use or endeavor to use any
electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication...;
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose,
to any other person the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or
having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection; [or]
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, to any
other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection.45
The Wiretap Act defines both "wire communications
'6
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
45 Id. § 2511(1).
46 Section 25 10(1) of the Wiretap Act states:
"Wire communication" means any aural transfer made in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the point of origin and the point
of reception (including the use of such connection in a
[VOL. 6N.C. J.L. & TECH.
and "electronic communications." 4 7 The notable difference
between the two definitions is that the definition of "electronic
communication" does not mention "electronic storage ' '48 of
electronic communications. Prior to Councilman, a majority of the
federal appellate courts held that electronic communications in
electronic storage could not be intercepted under the Wiretap Act
and viewed the term "intercept" as limited to "acquisition
contemporaneous with transmission.
' A9
switching station) furnished or operated by any person
engaged in providing or operating such facilities.., and such
term includes any electronic storage of such communication.
Id. § 25 10(1) (emphasis added).
47 Section 2510(12) of the Wiretap Act states:
"Electronic communication" means any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include-
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging
device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as
defined in section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by
financial institution in a communications system used for
the electronic storage and transfer of funds.
Id. § 2510(12).
48 Id. § 2510(17) (defining "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by
an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication").
49E.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003), as
amended, (Jan. 20, 2004) (holding that an intercept must occur
contemporaneously with transmission); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039,
1047-51 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (holding that an intercept did not occur because there
was no contemporaneous acquisition); United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp.
217 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that in order for the Wiretap Act to be violated
contemporaneous acquisition is necessary); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that obtaining
unread email messages from an electronic bulletin board does not constitute an
"intercept" under the Wiretap Act). But see United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1051, 1057 n. 11, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that "[t]o the extent that Turk
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B. USA PATRIOT Act
On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA.
PATRIOT Act"). The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Wiretap
Act to exclude "electronic storage" from the definition of "wire
,,50communications.' Despite this amendment, which will sunset on
December 31, 2005 unless renewed by Congress, confusion
continues to surround the Wiretap Act as it relates to the
interception of electronic communication. Notably, cases that have
taken into account the amendment made by the USA PATRIOT
Act and a case cited by Councilman continue to cause difficulty in
determining when electronic communications come under the
protection of the Wiretap Act.51 All references to the Wiretap Act
in Councilman apply the statute prior to its amendment.
C. United States v. Councilman
In Councilman, the defendant, Bradford C. Councilman,
was vice president of Interloc Inc. ("Interloc"). Interloc was
primarily an online bookstore specializing in rare and out-of-print
books, but Interloc also acted as an ISP and provided some of its
customers with email addresses.52 The defendant was in charge of
stands for a definition of 'intercept' that necessarily entails contemporaneity, it
has, at least in the context of wire communications, been statutorily overruled.").
50 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283
(2001). The USA PATRIOT Act passed 98 to 1 in the Senate and 357 to 66 in
the House. Because the Wiretap Act and the SCA share definitions, the USA
PATRIOT Act amended the SCA as well.
51 Note that one of the cases discussed in this Comment, Konop II, took into
account the amendments made by the USA PATRIOT Act and the difficulty in
determining when electronic communications come under the Wiretap Act has
not been resolved. It has been suggested that the USA PATRIOT Act may
indicate that Congress did not intend for the Wiretap Act to protect emails after
they have been delivered; however, in Councilman, the email was still in
transmission and had not yet been delivered.
52 373 F.3d 197, 198-99 (1st Cir. 2004). In order to send an email, you need a
connection to the Internet and an account with an ISP that forwards your email.
The data that is passed between the two computers is decoded using computer
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managing the ISP and the book dealer subscription list. In January
of 1998, the defendant instructed Interloc technicians to configure
and install email processing software that would copy and send all
email sent from Amazon.com, a competitor, to customers using an
Interloc-provided email address, to his personal email account
before it arrived in the intended recipient's mailbox.53 Interloc
used a program called procmail as its mail delivery agent
("MDA"), 4 and the systems administrator designed a mail
processing code called procmail.rc to "intercept, copy, and store all
incoming messages from Amazon.com' ' 55 before delivering them
to the intended recipient. The software copied all of the email
messages from Amazon.com while the MDA was in theprocess of
placing the email messages into the recipient's mailbox. The
defendant read thousands of emails in order to learn what types of
books customers demanded so Interloc could gain an advantage
protocols. The standard protocol used for sending Internet email is called
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ("SMTP"). Where the email passes from one
computer, known as a mail server, to another as it travels over the Internet. The
data in the message might be broken into smaller packets before it is sent. See
Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 613-14 (2003). When the data is in
smaller packets it can move more quickly. The ISP converts the data from the
phone line back to digital pulses, and its server interprets the information. When
you send an email message, your computer routes it to an SMTP server.
Computers pass the packets to each other and the server looks at the email
address, determines where to send it, and then forwards it to the recipient's mail
server. See J. Klensin, RFC 2821-Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, at
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2821.html (April 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Once the packets arrive at their
destination, they are reassembled to form a complete email. An MDA (the one
in the instant case is called procmail) places the message into the recipient's
mailbox. The email is stored in the recipient's electronic mailbox until the
recipient retrieves it. Id.
53 Councilman, 373 F.3d at 199.
54 For a discussion of the process of transmitting email, see Kerr, supra note 52.
55 Councilman, 373 F.3d at 199. It is interesting to note that the First Circuit
uses the word "intercept" to describe the action of the defendant before reaching
the question of whether his action constituted an intercept, which, interestingly
enough, they answer in the negative. The First Circuit's use of the word
"intercept" is at times confusing; the court switches back and forth between
using "intercept" colloquially and in accordance with its statutory meaning.56 id.
SPRING 2005] UNITED STATES V. CO UNCILMANV
over Amazon.57 As a result, the indictment charged the defendant
with conspiring to violate the Wiretap Act.58 According to 18
U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(a), criminal penalties will be imposed on "any
person who ... intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication. '" 59
The First Circuit held that electronic communications in
electronic storage are not covered by the intercept provisions of the
Wiretap Act. After further finding that the the electronic
communications at issue were in electronic storage, the court
concluded that no intercept occurred, and thus the Wiretap Act was
not violated.6'
D. Statutory Interpretation: Narrowing the Scope of
the Wiretap Act
In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,62 the United
States Supreme Court stated that, "[Iln interpreting a statute a court
should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others...
[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there." 63 The Court went
on to note in Germain that "[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry
is complete.'64
In Councilman, the First Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the defendant's activity "was an 'intercept' of a
communication within the meaning of the Wiretap Act."65 The
57 id.
58 Id. at 200.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (2000).
60 Councilman, 373 F.3d at 203.
61 Id. at 204.
62 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
63Id. at 253-54.
64 Id. at 254 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 442, 430 (1981)).
65 Councilman at 200 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000) defines
"intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device").
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First Circuit began its analysis of the issue much like the district
court by noting the difference between the definitions of "wire
communications" 66 and "electronic communications" 67 in the
Wiretap Act. As stated earlier, the notable difference between the
two is that the definition of "electronic communication" does not
mention "electronic storage" 68 of the electronic communications.
A well-known canon of statutory interpretation states that when
language appears in one section of a statute and not in another, the
omission is presumed to be intentional and purposeful.
69
Accordingly, the First Circuit found the language of the statute to
be unambiguous and held that "Congress did not intend for the
Wiretap Act's interception provisions to apply to communication
in electronic storage., 70 By adopting this broad definition of
electronic storage, the First Circuit narrowed the scope of the
Wiretap Act. In accordance with the First Circuit's interpretation,
one can "intercept" a wire communication in storage, however, one
cannot "intercept" an electronic communication in storage.
E. Interception of Email During Transmission Versus
Access to Email in Storage
After determining that the Wiretap Act was not applicable
to electronic communications in electronic storage, the First
Circuit considered whether the electronic communications at issue
were "in transit" or "in storage." The software installed at the
instruction of the defendant copied the email messages in real time
while they were in the process of being delivered. While the
66 For the Wiretap Act definition of "wire communication," see supra note 46.
67 For the Wiretap Act definition of "electronic communication," see supra note
47.
68 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000) (defining "electronic storage" as "(A) any
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communication").
69 See generally In re Hart, 328 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2003); Estate of Bell v.
Comm'r, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991).
70 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 201 (1 st Cir. 2004) (citing United
States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass., 2003)).
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software obtained the email messages in the course of their
delivery, the email messages also existed in the random access
memory ("RAM") of Interloc's computer system. The First
Circuit characterized these electronic communications as in
electronic storage, so the requisite interception was lacking, and
the communications did not come within the scope of the
protections under the Wiretap Act.
The First Circuit stated that "[o]n the facts of this case, it is
clear that the electronic communications in this case were in a
'form of electronic storage." 71 Although the court agreed with the
government that the electronic communications at issue were
acquired in a different manner than those in Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Service and Konop v. Hawaiian
72Airlines, Inc., it nonetheless dismissed the distinction and held
the presence of the words "any temporary, intermediate storage" 73
controlled with regard to determining the nature of the electronic
communication as either in transmission or in electronic storage.
F. Misinterpretation and Misapplication of Prior Case
Law
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service74
was the first case to address the issue of intercept as it relates to
electronic communications under the Wiretap Act. The sole and
narrow issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was "whether the
seizure of a computer on which is stored private e-mail that has
been sent to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read
(retrieved) by the recipients, constitutes an 'intercept' proscribed
by 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a).',75 The appellant in this case, Steve
71 Councilman, 373 F.3d at 203, (emphasis added).
72 See discussion infra Part III.F.
71 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2000).
74 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit did not address the SCA
because the district court in Steve Jackson Games had previously held that the
Secret Service violated the SCA by seizing stored electronic communications
without complying with the appropriate statutory provisions. Each of the
appellants was awarded $1,000 in damages and the Secret Service did not
challenge this ruling.
71 Id. at 460.
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Jackson Games, Inc. ("SJG"), published books, magazines, and
games. In the mid-1980s, SJG began operating an electronic
bulletin board system named Illuminati.76 SJG used Illuminati to
post information about its business, to communicate with
customers, and to allow its customers to send and receive private
emails.77 These private emails were temporarily stored on
Illuminati's hard disk until the customers contacted Illuminati to
read their mail.78 After the customers read their email, they could
choose either to save it on Illuminati's hard drive or to delete it
entirely.
79
In October of 1988, the Director of Network Security
Technology began investigating the duplication and distribution of
a computerized text file by SJG that contained information about
another company's emergency call system. 80 The director notified
the Secret Service in July of 1989 about the unauthorized
distribution.81 In February of 1990, the Secret Service discovered
that the information about the emergency call system was available
on a bulletin board operated by one of SJG's employees, who also
82had the ability to review and delete any data on Illuminati. In
late February 1990, a Secret Service agent applied for a warrant to
search the employee's residence and SJG's premises. The
following day, the Secret Service obtained a warrant to search the
appellant's residence. The Secret Service seized the appellant's
computer during the course of the investigation and read and
deleted 162 email messages that had not yet been retrieved by their
intended recipients.
83
The district court held that the Secret Service did not
"intercept" the email in violation of Wiretap Act because its
acquisition of the contents of the electronic communications was
not contemporaneous with the transmission of those
76 Id. at 458.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Id.80 Id. at 458-59.
81 Id. at 459.
82 See id.
83 id.
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communications. 84 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and
held that Congress's definition of "electronic communication" was
meant to exclude electronic communications in storage from the
protections of the Wiretap Act and that "the seizure of sent but
unretrieved e-mail did not constitute an intercept for purposes of
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(a)."85
Similarly, in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.86 ("Konop
If'), the Ninth Circuit relied on the analysis in Steve Jackson
Games. Konop II dealt with the narrow issue of whether an
employer violated either the Wiretap Act or the SCA when he
accessed an employee's secure website. 87 Hawaiian Airlines
employed the appellant, Konop, as a pilot. Konop created and
maintained a website where he posted various bulletins containing
negative content regarding his employer, its officers, and the
union. 88 Konop compiled a list of employees who were eligible to
access the website and provided them with a user name and
password. Once on the website, an eligible person could enter his
or her name, create a password, and then click on a button marked
"submit," which would indicate acceptance of the terms of use.89
" Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Tex. 1993).
85 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 202 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir.
1994)).
86 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003) (interpreting
the Wiretap Act as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act). In prior history,
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Konop I"),
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Wiretap Act before it was amended by the USA
PATRIOT Act. In Konop I the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Steve Jackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) and held
that "[t]he contents of secure websites are 'electronic communications' in
intermediate storage that are protected from unauthorized interception under the
Wiretap Act." Konop I, 236 F.3d at 1048. The USA PATRIOT Act was
enacted shortly after the Ninth Circuit withdrew its Konop I opinion on Aug. 28,
2001. This legislation amended the Wiretap Act; the definition of "wire
communication" no longer includes "storage." See USA PATRIOT Act § 209,
115 Stat. at 283.87 Konop II, 302 F.3d at 874.
88 Id. at 872.
89 Id. at 872-73.
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Only registered users were allowed access to the website.
90
Visitors were required to log on to the website with a user name
and password. The terms prohibited non-eligible parties like
Hawaiian management, from accessing the website. The terms
also prohibited any eligible person from showing the contents of
the website to anyone else.
In December of 1995, the vice president of Hawaiian
Airlines approached one of these eligible people and asked for
permission to view the website. The employee agreed to let the
vice president access the website using his name. Since the
employee had never accessed the website to register, the vice
president used the employee's name to create an account.92 That
same day, the union chairman contacted Konop and informed him
that the vice president of Hawaiian Airlines was upset by the
information posted on Konop's website. Konop took the website
off-line that same day but restored it the following day. During
this time, the vice president of Hawaiian Airlines continued to
access and view Konop's website.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on Steve Jackson Games, held
that "for a website such as Konop's to be intercepted in violation
of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not
while it is in electronic storage." 9 The court noted that its
conclusion was "consistent with the ordinary meaning of
'intercept,' which is 'to stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or
course before arrival.' 94 The Ninth Circuit noted in Konop II that
[t]here are no Supreme Court cases interpreting the
provisions of the Wiretap A& and the Stored
Communications Act as they relate to electronic
communications, and the court of appeals decisions,
in our circuit and others, either do not deal with
stored electronic communications, or are
9 0 Id.
91 Id. at 873.
92 id.
" Id. at 878.94 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 630 (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit explained that "intercept" means "acquiring" the contents of a
communication, while access merely involves being in a position to acquire the
contents of a communication. Id.
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superseded by changes in law and technology, or
both.95
In Councilman, the First Circuit incorrectly interpreted the
facts unique to that case to be in line with settled law.96 In making
its ruling, the court not only relied on the language of the statute
but also on the decisions of other circuits. The First Circuit noted
that the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games held that "Congress
did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to 'electronic
communications' when those communications are in 'electronic
storage."' 97 The court also noted that in Konop II, the Ninth
Circuit took a strict view of the phrase "in storage" and held that a
violation of the Wiretap Act does not occur when an electronic
communication is accessed during storage, even if the acquisition
takes place in a split second of storage along the path of
transmission.98 The First Circuit took settled law that dealt with
extremely narrow and specific issues and applied those holdings to
the case at bar. The overall effect of this action was to narrow the
scope of the Wiretap Act even further than previous cases. The
First Circuit's decision in Councilman ultimately left email
communications, which are at times in storage and in transit
simultaneously,99 without any protection from interception under
the Wiretap Act.
Both cases that the First Circuit relied heavily upon are
distinguishable from the facts in Councilman. Neither Steve
Jackson Games nor Konop II directly address the issue presented
in Councilman. Konop II dealt with an entirely different issue:
communications accessed on a private website by an employer.100
95 Id. at 891.
96 For a criticism of the decision, see Editorial, Derail E-mail Snooping, WASH.
POST, July 2, 2004, at A14 (stating that "email has become too ubiquitous" for
Councilman to stand), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A22198-2004Jul 1 .html.
97 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 202 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
98 Id. (citing Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003)).
99 United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003).0 Konop II, 302 F.3d at 872-73.
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In Steve Jackson Games, the email at issue had already been sent
and was in the recipient's mailbox at the time that it was obtained
by the Secret Service; it just had not been read by the recipient. 101
In other words, the email made its way from computer A to
computer B and was in computer B at the time it was obtained.
The court characterized this state as "in storage." Councilman,
however, deals with electronic communications that were sent via
email but obtained prior to reaching the intended recipient's
mailbox. This distinction, which the First Circuit failed to
consider, is crucial in determining whether the email at issue was
in storage or in transit. This issue should have been the main focus
of the First Circuit, but it was not addressed by the Fifth, Ninth, or
First Circuit.
The First Circuit failed to adequately address whether email
messages being processed for delivery are in electronic storage.
While the First Circuit took great care in examining the statute and
precedent in order to establish that electronic communications in
electronic storage are not covered by the Wiretap Act because the
requisite interception is missing, it should have carefully crafted its
issue to reflect the distinct set of facts presented by Councilman.
Because the email messages in Councilman did not reach the inbox
of their intended recipients, the First Circuit should have found that
they were not in storage but rather that they were still in transit.
However, as noted before, the First Circuit simply stated that,
"[o]n the facts of this case, it is clear that the electronic
communications in this case were in a form of electronic
storage."''0
2
V. First Circuit to Rehear Councilman En Banc
On October 5, 2004, the First Circuit announced that a
majority of its judges voted to rehear Councilman en banc.l0 3 One
1o' Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460
(5th Cir. 1994).
102 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).
103 United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004), withdrawing and
vacating 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
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of the primary issues that the court will consider in rehearing the
case is whether the language of the Wiretap Act is ambiguous.
The court also requested that the parties submit supplemental
briefs addressing two questions: (1) "[w]hether the conduct at
issue in this case could have been additionally, or alternatively,
prosecuted under the Stored Communications Act?" 104 and (2)
"[w]hether the rule of lenity precludes prosecution in this case?"' 10 5
A. Whether the Language of the Wiretap Act is
Ambiguous
In rehearing the case, the First Circuit must consider
whether the language of the Wiretap Act is ambiguous.
"Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different
senses." 10 6 After a close reading of the statute, it becomes clear
that it is possible for well-informed persons reading the Wiretap
Act to reasonably disagree as to its meaning.
A majority of the First Circuit held that the Wiretap Act
was unambiguous. 0 7 As previously discussed, the court placed
great weight on the fact that the definition of "wire
communication" included "electronic storage" while "electronic
communication" did not. The court stopped its inquiry here, held
that the statute was unambiguous, and concluded that "electronic
communications" in "electronic storage" are not protected by the
Wiretap Act.108
In rehearing the case, the court should extend its analysis
by examining the rest of the language of the statute. When the
ECPA is examined as a whole, ambiguity is apparent because
104 Id. Note that the defendant in Councilman, relying on the provider
exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1), made the argument that his conduct was
lawful under the SCA and was therefore outside the scope of the Wiretap Act.
The First Circuit did not address this argument because it went beyond the
charges in the indictment.
105 Id.
106 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02, at
11-12 (6th ed. 2000).
107 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1 st Cir. 2004).
108 Id.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
different meanings become evident.'0 9 The First Circuit should
begin by taking a closer look at the structure of the shared
definitions in the statute. Namely, the structure of the definition of
"wire communication" is different than the structure of the
definition of "electronic communication." The definition of "wire
communication" contains no exceptions, while the definition of
"electronic communication" excludes certain communications that
fail to qualify as electronic communications. The list of
communications that fail to qualify as electronic communications
does not include stored communications. Next, the First Circuit
should take note that the language of the statute suggests that
electronic communications are not distinct from communications
in electronic storage. Multiple sections of the Wiretap Act and the
SCA refer to electronic communications in electronic storage; 10 if
communications in electronic storage are excluded from the
definition of electronic communication then this language would
make little to no sense.
Thus, upon a closer look at the language of the statute,
there are at least two reasonable understandings of the language of
the Wiretap Act: (1) the definition of electronic communication
does not include electronic storage, or (2) the definition of
electronic communication does include electronic storage.
Accordingly, the Wiretap Act is, on its face, ambiguous. In
rehearing the case, in order to resolve the ambiguity, the court
should look to the statute as a whole, the objective and purpose to
be obtained, and legislative history and intent.1
109 SINGER, supra note 106, § 46.05, at 154 (stating that "[a] statute is passed as a
whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection
with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole."); see also
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
("There is no more likely a way to misapprehend the meaning of language-be
it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract-than to read the words
literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is meant to
secure.").
"0 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(17), 2701(a), 2703(a) (2000); see also Supplemental Brief
for the United States at 13-14, United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1383).
i11 SINGER, supra note 106, § 45.05, at 30-31; see discussion infra Parts 1, 11,
and III.F; see also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 218 F.2d 1 (10th
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B. Whether the Conduct Could Have Been Prosecuted
Under the SCA
1. Title II of the ECPA: The SCA
Title II of the ECPA, commonly referred to as the SCA,
addresses access to stored wire and electronic communications.'
12
It serves the dual purpose of protecting privacy interests and the
Government's legitimate law enforcement needs." 3 The SCA
adopts the same definitions used in the Wiretap Act.' 14 Under the
SCA, whoever
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this
section. 115
The civil and criminal penalties provided by the SCA are less
stringent than those provided for under the Wiretap Act. The SCA
excludes from liability conduct that is "authorized by a user of that
service with respect to a communication of or intended for that
user."
1 16
The SCA applies to two categories of communications:
Cir. 1954) (noting that if there is ambiguity, the consequences of the different
interpretations may be considered by the court).
112 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
113 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463
(5th Cir. 1994).




6 Id. § 270 1(c)(2). A person may authorize a third party's access to an
electronic communication if the person is (1) a user of the service and (2) the
communication is of or intended for that user. "User" is defined by the statute
as one who (1) uses the service and (2) is duly authorized to do so. Id.
§ 2510(13).
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"those associated with transmission and incident thereto" and those
"of a backup variety." 117 The SCA, however, does not apply to
messages that are still in transmission." 8 Electronic messages that
are in transmission are covered by the Wiretap Act. Thus the
difference between the Wiretap Act and the SCA is that the
Wiretap Act covers the intentional interception of electronic
communications in transit, while the SCA covers intentional access
without authorization to stored electronic communications.
In Steve Jackson Games, the Fifth Circuit did not directly
address the SCA because the district court had previously held that
the Secret Service violated the SCA by seizing stored electronic
communications without complying with the appropriate statutory
provisions.'19 In Konop II, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's holding that Hawaiian Airlines was
exempt from liability under § 2701 (c)(2). 120 The Ninth Circuit
noted that if neither of the employees was a "user" of the website
at the time he allowed the vice president of Hawaiian Airlines to
access the website, then they could not, under § 2701(c)(2),
authorize the vice president's access to the website. 12 1
2. Councilman and the SCA
In Councilman, count one of the indictment charged the
defendant with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 2511.122 In addition to moving to dismiss the
indictment for failure to state an offense under the Wiretap Act, the
defendant also argued that his conduct was lawful under the SCA
and therefore outside of the scope of the criminal provisions of the
117 H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
118 H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 65.
119 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th
Cir. 1994). Each of the appellants was awarded $1,000 in damages, and the
Secret Service did not challenge this ruling. Id
120 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1193 (2003). The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court did not
make any findings on whether the employees actually used Konop's website.
Only a user can authorize a third party's access to the communication. Id.
121 Id. at 880.
122 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 199 (lst Cir. 2004).
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Wiretap Act.123 The SCA does not contain any of the special
protections afforded by the Wiretap Act. 24 Currently, it is easier
for private actors such as Councilman to access private
communications under the SCA. 125 The First Circuit noted that the
defendant's argument went beyond the charges of the indictment
and stated that "[g]iven our reading of the Wiretap Act, we need
not comment on this argument."
'' 2P
Additionally, the defendant should have been prosecuted
under the SCA. In the absence of a clear delineation between the
coverage of the Wiretap Act and the SCA, and given the fact that
email can be "in transit" and "in storage" simultaneously, one
solution might be to require the government to bring a charge of
123 In United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320 (2003), the district
court addressed the SCA. The District Court noted that electronic
communications that are "in storage" are covered by the SCA and that persons
violating the'SCA are subject to criminal penalties. The district court went on to
state that the exemption would apply pursuant to § 2701(c)(1), to a person or
entity providing wire or electronic communications service. However, the
district court did not address whether the conduct was "authorized," a
preliminary requirement for the exception to apply under § 270 1(c)(1). Id.
124 The distinction between classifying an electronic communication as coming
under the Wiretap Act or the SCA is crucial when it comes to protection. The
Wiretap Act contains procedural protections that go beyond the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment and that are not applicable to the SCA. Under the
Wiretap Act, (1) officers are only permitted to obtain wiretap orders for
investigations that involve a federal felony; (2) in addition to probable cause,
officers must give specific information regarding the types of communication
that would likely be intercepted, and the steps that they will take to avoid
obtaining more information than is necessary to their investigation; (3) the
wiretap only lasts for the shorter of thirty days or as long as necessary to obtain
the information; (4) the government may be required by the court to provide
regular updates and to keep the tapes of the wiretap under seal; (5) the court
must notify the target that their communication may have been intercepted; and
(6) if any of the rules are violated, the evidence obtained through the wiretap is
automatically excluded, even if it does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
125 The special protections afforded by the Wiretap Act are not contained in the
SCA. Namely, federal law enforcement agents can obtain such communications
merely by obtaining a warrant. Furthermore, outside of the Fourth Amendment,
a defendant does not have the right to move to suppress communications that
were obtained in violation of the SCA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
126 Councilman, 373 F.3d at 204.
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conspiracy to violate the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, together
with conspiracy to violate the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, and vice
versa. 127 The court would then be able to examine both titles of the
ECPA concurrently to determine which more aptly fits the nature
("in transit" or "in storage") of the electronic communication at
issue. If the First Circuit had examined the Wiretap Act and the
SCA concurrently, perhaps it would have noted that its
interpretation of the Wiretap Act prohibited the electronic
communications from receiving protection under the Wiretap Act
or the SCA. In Councilman, an ISP acquired electronic
communications without consequence under the Wiretap Act or the
SCA. The electronic communication was not protected under the
Wiretap Act because it was in transit and in storage simultaneously
and the requisite interception was missing; the acquisition of the
electronic communication was not protected under the SCA
because the defendant was not indicted under the SCA. However,
even if the defendant had been indicted under the SCA, the district
court in Councilman suggested that the defendant would qualify
for the provider exception under SCA § 2701 (c)(1). 128 If the
district court is correct, ISPs will be allowed to acquire electronic
communications that are simultaneously "in transit" and "in
storage" without consequence.
C. Whether the Rule of Lenity Precludes Prosecution
in This Case
The rule of lenity is "[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
127 However, even if the charges are brought concurrently, whether the
electronic communications are protected will depend on how the court interprets
the scope of the protection, see infra notes 151 and 152.
128 The electronic communication at issue falls out of the protection of the
Wiretap Act because it is in transit and in storage simultaneously. The
electronic communication at issue falls out of the SCA because the defendant
was not indicted under the SCA. Note that even if the defendant had been
indicted under the SCA, the district court in Councilman suggested that the
defendant would qualify for the provider exception under the SCA § 2701 (c)(1).
Yet, whether the defendant would qualify for the provider exception is
questionable, see supra text accompanying note 123.
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multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity
in favor of the more lenient punishment."' 2 9 In Beecham v. United
States,130 the United States Supreme Court noted that in deciding
whether a statute is so ambiguous as to warrant the application of
the rule of lenity, "our task is not the hopeless one of ascertaining
what the legislators who passed the law would have decided had
they reconvened to consider petitioners' particular cases. Rather, it
is to determine whether the language the legislators actually
enacted has a plain, unambiguous meaning."' 31 Thus the rule of
lenity applies only if, "after consulting traditional canons of
statutory construction[, the Court is] left with an ambiguous
statute."'32 The Court has also recognized that "[t]he fact that [a
criminal statute] has been applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth."' 13
3
The First Circuit, with the rehearing in mind, asked the
parties to address the question of whether the rule of lenity would
preclude prosecution in this case. 134 The applicability of the rule
of lenity can be examined on two levels in this case: (1) if the
elements of the crime are deemed ambiguous, the rule of lenity
would preclude prosecution 135 and (2) if the application of
129 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1069 (7th ed. 1999); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 197 (2001) (stating that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be
resolved in the defendant's favor).
130 511 U.S. 368 (1994).
11 d. at 374.
132 United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994).
133 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994) (quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
134 United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793, withdrawing and vacating 373
F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
135 If on the face of the statute the elements of the crime are ambiguous, the rule
of lenity would operate in favor of the defendant to preclude prosecution.
Consider the following example: (1) a cause of action is brought under the
Wiretap Act; (2) the Wiretap Act is ambiguous-there is a question as to
whether communications in electronic storage can be intercepted in violation of
the Wiretap Act; (3) there is also a question as to the nature of the electronic
communication-whether it is in electronic storage or in transit; (4) under the
rule of lenity, viewing the action of the defendant in a light most favorable to
him, his actions do not constitute an intercept because the communications were
classified as in electronic storage and fall out of the protections of the Wiretap
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
punishment under one of the titles is ambiguous, the rule of lenity
would operate to impose the more lenient punishment. 1
36
Act; and (5) prosecution is precluded. In Councilman, the court grappled with
whether electronic communications in electronic storage can be intercepted
under the Wiretap Act. The court found the language of the statute to be
unambiguous and held that its protections did not extend to electronic
communications in electronic storage. 373 F.3d at 201.
136 When the ECPA is viewed as a whole statute, the acquisition of the electronic
communication at issue will fall under either the Wiretap Act or the SCA and be
subject to the punishments of the applicable provision. If on the face of the
statute the application of punishment is ambiguous, the rule of lenity would
operate to impose the more lenient punishment. Under the rule of lenity, if the
acquisition of the electronic communication falls under the Wiretap Act, it
would be subject to the more lenient punishment under the Wiretap Act, and if
the acquisition of the electronic communication falls under the SCA, it would be
subject to the more lenient punishment under the SCA. The Wiretap Act and the
SCA provide for multiple punishments. The criminal and civil penalties
provided by the SCA are less stringent than those provided for under the
Wiretap Act.
In Councilman, when the rule of lenity is applied to both the Wiretap
Act and the SCA, the outcome with regard to criminal penalties is the same-a
fine. Violation of the Wiretap Act is punishable by a fine or imprisonment not
more than five years, or both. However, ISPs do not intercept, and thus do not
violate the Wiretap Act, when they are acting in the ordinary course of business.
See Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1230 (2d Cir. Jan.
25, 2005). If the Wiretap Act is viewed as ambiguous and the rule of lenity is
applied in this case, assuming that a violation was found, the lesser punishment
of a fine would be imposed. It is unlikely that Councilman's actions would
escape liability by qualifying as "in the ordinary course of business." The SCA
provides that "a person or entity providing electronic communication service to
the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)(1) (2000). In regard to criminal penalties under the SCA, a first
offense violation is punishable by a fine or imprisonment not more than one year
or both. The SCA also provides that, even in the case of a first offense, "if the
offense is committed for the purposes of commercial advantage, malicious
destruction or damage, or private commercial gain, or in furtherance of any
criminal or tortious act," it is punishable by a fine or imprisonment not more
than five years, or both. Id. § 2701(b)(1)(A). The SCA excludes from liability
"conduct authorized by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service." Id. § 2701(c)(1). The First Circuit stated that
Councilman, in obtaining the emails, did so "seeking to gain a commercial
advantage." United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 199 (1 st Cir. 2004).
That said, the punishment of either a fine or not more than five years
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The rule of lenity cannot operate to move a person whose
actions qualified under one title of the ECPA into another title of
the ECPA. A violation of the Wiretap Act involves interception of
electronic communication and is not equal to a violation of the
SCA, which involves the intentional, unauthorized access of stored
communications. Since violation of these provisions is not equal, a
person cannot be taken out of one of these provisions and
substituted into the other for the benefit of more lenient
punishment.
Under the majority and the dissent's interpretation of the
Wiretap Act, the rule of lenity would not be applicable in
Councilman. According to the majority's interpretation of the
Wiretap Act, the rule of lenity would not apply because the
Wiretap Act is not ambiguous. 37 In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Lipez failed to find the Wiretap Act unambiguous on its face;
imprisonment would be applicable. If the court viewed the SCA as ambiguous
and found a violation of the SCA, under the rule of lenity, a fine would be
imposed as punishment. Under the facts of this case, since Councilman's
actions were done in order to gain an advantage over the competition, the
multiple punishments proscribed by the Wiretap Act and the SCA would be the
same.
In regard to civil penalties, the rule of lenity would operate to produce
different results under the Wiretap Act and the SCA. The Wiretap Act allows
for appropriate relief, which includes, "(1) such preliminary and other equitable
or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (2) damages under subsection (c)
and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and (3) a reasonable attorney's fee
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b). Damages
are the greater of either the sum of the actual damages incurred by the plaintiff
plus any profits made by the defendant as a result of the violation, or statutory
damages of whichever is greater-$ 100 a day for each day of the violation or
$10,000. Id. § 2520(c)(2). Under the Wiretap Act, the rule of lenity, if.
applicable, would operate to impose the lesser of the two penalties. The SCA
also allows for the private right of action for any person aggrieved by any
violation of the SCA. Id. § 2707. Appropriate relief includes "(1) such
preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (2)
damages under subsection (c); and (3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred." Id. In computing damages, no person
entitled to recover shall receive less that $1,000 and in the case of willful or
intentional violations, punitive damages may be accessed. Id. § 2707(c). So, if
the rule of lenity applies, the punishment under the SCA would be less stringent
than under the Wiretap Act.
137 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004).
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however, he resolved the ambiguity by looking to legislative
history and intent.1 38 Judge Lipez noted that the statutory canon
relied on by the majority, that when Congress includes certain
language in one part of a statute and not in another it is generally
presumed that Congress did so intentionally, is itself subject to
certain exceptions. According to Judge Lipez, this canon is only
used as an aid and must yield when a contrary intent on the part of
the lawmaker is apparent.' 39 After a close look at the legislative
intent behind the Wiretap Act, Judge Lipez concluded that the text
of the Wiretap Act is not as plain as the majority may suggest.
40
After consulting legislative history and intent, Judge Lipez
resolved the ambiguity. The rule of lenity applies where "a
reasonable doubt persists about the statute's intended scope even
after resort to the statute's language, structure, legislative history,
and motivating policies.' 4 1 Thus, under Judge Lipez's
interpretation of the statute, and the majority's for that matter, the
rule of lenity would not apply.
In United States v. Ahlers,142 the First Circuit held that "a
statute is not ambiguous simply because litigants (or even an
occasional court) question its interpretation. It is only when no
reasonably clear meaning can be gleaned from the text of a statute,
leaving courts to guess at what Congress intended, that the rule of
lenity comes into play." 143 Thus, under the court's previous
reasoning, it would be reasonable to conclude that the rule of lenity
would not apply in Councilman. With the aid of the traditional
138 Id. at 211 (Lipez, J., dissenting opinion). Judge Lipez noted that the purpose
of the ECPA was to expand the protections afforded electronic communications.
He also stated that the reason the definition of wire communications included
electronic storage was to account specifically for voicemail. Judge Lipez's
interpretation of the Wiretap Act is consistent with that of the government-an
intercept occurs when one acquires an electronic communication
contemporaneous with transmission.139 Id. at 210 (Lipez, J., dissenting opinion).
140 For an account of the legislative history behind the ECPA, see discussion
sufpra Parts I and II.
14 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 197 (2004) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103 (1990)).
142 305 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002).
143 Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 62 (citing United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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canons of statutory construction, any ambiguities would be
remedied and the rule of lenity is no longer necessary. Ultimately,
the rule of lenity would not apply in this case because it is highly
unlikely that the court would be unable to resolve the ambiguity
after employing the traditional canons of statutory construction.
VI. Negative Implications of the Councilman Reading of the
Wiretap Act When Read in Conjunction with the SCA
The First Circuit's decision in Councilman runs contrary to
the stated purpose of the ECPA. The stated purpose of the ECPA
is to protect the privacy of communications; however, the First
Circuit's interpretation of the Wiretap Act affords email very little
to no protection.
Senator Leahy, an influential author of the ECPA,
commented on the Councilman decision, stating that:
The 2-to- 1 decision by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals in a case called United States v.
Councilman has dealt a serious blow to online
privacy .... If allowed to stand, this decision
threatens to eviscerate Congress's careful efforts to
ensure that privacy is protected in the modem
information age.
[The enactment of the] ECPA was a careful,
bipartisan and long-planned effort to protect
electronic communications in two forms-from
real-time monitoring or interception as they were
being delivered, and from searches when they were
stored in record systems. We recognized these as
different functions and set rules for each based on
the relevant privacy expectations and threats to
privacy implicated by the different forms of
surveillance.
The Councilman decision turned this
'44The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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distinction on its head. 1
45
As Judge Lipez noted in his dissent, under the majority's
approach, "e-mail would only be subject to the Wiretap Act when
it is traveling through cables and not when it is being processed by
electronic switches and computers during transit and delivery.
The broad view taken as to what constitutes a stored electronic
communication makes it virtually impossible to intercept email
messages. 147 In characterizing the emails at issue as in electronic
145 150 CONG. REC. S7893-96 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
But see Saul Hansell, You've Got Mail (and Court Says Others Can Read It),
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at Cl (noting that some experts argue that
Councilman will have little practical effect, "[w]hile the Councilman ruling
would limit the applicability of wiretap laws to e-mail, it appears to apply to a
very small number of potential cases"); Cynthia A. Casby, E-mail Spying May
Not Violate the Wiretap Act, Holland & Knight Intellectual Property and
Technology, vol. 7 (Sept. 30, 2004) (noting that the House of Representatives
introduced two bills to extend the protection of email privacy to messages in
electronic storage), available at
http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/Newsletters.asp?ID=502&Article=2727.
146 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 207 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting opinion); see, e.g., Brian Braiker, Wiretapping the Web: A literal
reading of electronic eavesdropping laws---coupled with new FCC proposal-
may make it easier for Washington to wiretap online, NEWSWEEK, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5697267/site/newsweek/ (Aug. 13, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Online Privacy "Eviscerated" by First Circuit Decision, at
http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2004_06.php#oo1658 (June 29, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Kim Zetter, Court
Creates Snoopers' Heaven, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1 848,64094,00.html (July 6, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
147 Judge Stephen Reinhardt stated,
[A] reading of the Wiretap Act that includes stored electronic
communications in the statute's "intercept" provision is
consistent with the nature of the technology at issue, leaves no
unexplained statutory gaps, and renders none of the myriad
provisions of either the Wiretap Act or the Stored
Communications Act superfluous. Under such a reading, the
Wiretap Act would prohibit the interception of electronic
communications, both stored and en route, and subject
violators to serious penalties. [T]his reading, consistent with
Congressional intent as revealed in the legislative history of
the statute, rejects the idea that stored electronic
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storage, the First Circuit fails to take into account the very nature
of email. During transit and delivery, email is constantly stored in
some temporary manner. 1
48
The email messages in Councilman were obtained while en
route to their destination. In order for an email message to be
delivered quickly, it is broken down into packets.149 When the
MDA, procmail, that is responsible for delivering the email
messages to their intended recipients, receives the messages, the
email messages exist in the RAM within the computer system.
The First Circuit pointed to the existence of the emails in RAM
during delivery as constituting storage. This interpretation
narrowed the coverage of the Wiretap Act to the point that
electronic communications that are capable of being characterized
as either "in transmission" or "in storage" because they are in both
at the same time, ultimately run the risk of being intercepted
without consequence, thus falling out of the protection of both the
Wiretap Act and the SCA. For instance, in Steve Jackson Games,
the Fifth Circuit held that the received, but unread, email messages
were in storage and did not receive protection under the Wiretap
Act. One might naively assume that these email messages would
receive protection under the SCA but that is not always so clear.' 50
communications are afforded a lesser degree of protection
from interception than stored wire communications.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 891 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting opinion).
148 In addition, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the
American Library Association filed an amicus brief supporting the appellant's
petition for a rehearing en banc. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Center for
Democracy and Technology, Inc. et. al. at 2, United States v. Councilman, 373
F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1383). The brief states that Councilman
"effectively rewrites the field of Intemet surveillance law in ways that no one in
Congress ever imagined" and "unhinges the Wiretap Act from the Fourth
Amendment decision it codifies, Berger v. New York, 288 U.S. 41 (1967)." Id.
149 Kerr, supra note 52.
150 In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Tex. 1993), the district court held that the Secret Service violated the
SCA; the Secret Service did not challenge this ruling. The Fifth Circuit did note
that its conclusion that the Secret Service did not violate the Wiretap Act was
reinforced by the fact that the SCA more appropriately applied to their conduct.
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Some courts have held that the definition of storage limits the
protection afforded email messages to intermediate storage before
delivery,' 5' while other courts have held that the protection
afforded email messages in storage also applies to an email's
post-transmission storage.
152
The First Circuit noted that the "intersection of the Wiretap
Act and the Stored Communications Act 'is a complex, often
convoluted, area of the law."' 153 While the statement is true, this
does not mean that courts should permit acquisition of electronic
communications without consequence. Courts should not be able
to define the nature of an electronic communication so as to avoid
application of the protections of the Wiretap Act and the SCA.
Because electronic communications are in transit and storage
simultaneously, 5 4 courts could potentially define the electronic
communications as in electronic storage in order to avoid the
protections of the Wiretap Act and at the same time, as in the
process of being delivered or in transmission to avoid the SCA.
In order to prevent ISPs from acquiring electronic
communications without consequence, courts should take
measures to protect electronic communications. In hearing cases
involving electronic communication, courts should examine the
In cases such as these, the Fifth Circuit noted the importance of construing the
ECPA as a whole.
151 In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a class action against largest provider of Internet
advertising products and services in the world where Internet users challenged
provider's storage of computer programs on computer hard drives of users who
access websites affiliated with provider; the pleadings and evidence failed to
prove that the provider's methods violated the SCA or the Wiretap Act).
152 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth
Circuit affirmed its interpretation of the SCA in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), withdrawn by, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that an individual and his attorney violated federal electronic privacy and
computer fraud statutes when they used a patently unlawful subpoena to gain
access to email stored by a corporation's ISP-they were held civilly liable
under the SCA because they procured the ISP's consent by exploiting a mistake
of which they had constructive knowledge and access was not otherwise
authorized).
153 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998)).
154 United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003).
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ECPA as a whole and implement a test to determine which title of
the ECPA is applicable to the electronic communication at issue.
Courts should examine both titles of the ECPA, the Wiretap
Act and the SCA, concurrently; this will help to prevent electronic
communications from being acquired without consequence. It will
also serve to further effectuate the purpose of the ECPA-to
protect electronic communications. Furthermore, viewing the
ECPA as one cohesive statute will force courts to determine the
primary nature of the electronic communication at issue, either "in
transit" or "in storage."
In addition to viewing the ECPA as a whole, courts should
employ a test to determine the primary nature of the electronic
communication. Such a test would aid the courts in determining
which title of the ECPA governs electronic communication that is
both "in transit" and "in storage." One such solution, which would
not require amending the ECPA, would require courts to examine
the nature of the electronic communication and classify it
according to which state it is "predominantly in" at the time it is
obtained or acquired. For example, perhaps what is occurring in
Councilman is not temporary storage (as is included within the
definition of electronic storage), but rather it is better characterized
as storage necessary to facilitate the transmission of email. In this
case, transmission should control because it is the primary and
predominant action taking place. This "predominantly in" test
would benefit courts by allowing them to more easily determine
the nature of the electronic communication at issue and thus which
title of the ECPA would be applicable in the situation.
Furthermore, this proposed test would be in accord with
settled law, namely Steve Jackson Games. Steve Jackson Games
has been criticized on the ground that the email at issue was
obtained from the recipient's inbox prior to being read and as such,
the email was still in transmission because delivery was not
completed. The proposed test, however, would rid the court's
decision of this criticism. Under the proposed test, the Fifth
Circuit's decision would be justified because at the time that the
email messages were obtained, they were in the recipient's inbox
(they just had not been read); this state can be classified as
predominately in storage.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the First Circuit has
suggested in Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. 155 that electronic
communications are protected when they are in storage because by
their nature they are in storage and transit simultaneously.' 56 The
First Circuit noted in dicta that the Wiretap Act bans the
interception of all electronic communications that are in transit,
whether or not they are stored temporarily.157 This statement
suggests that the First Circuit is at times confused and unclear as to
its own position on what constitutes an "intercept" under the
Wiretap Act.
VII. Conclusion
The Fifth Circuit noted that the Wiretap Act is "famous (if
not infamous) for its lack of clarity."'158 Courts have made
reference to the notion that this is a problem that Congress, not the
courts, should fix.' 59 Congress could amend the ECPA to clarify
the provisions regarding interception of electronic communications
and electronic storage.' 60 However, until then, courts should
155 329 F.3d 9 (2003).
156 Here, the First Circuit stated in dicta that the Wiretap Act bans the
interception of all electronic communications that are in transit, whether or not
they are stored temporarily. The First Circuit found that a plaintiff must
demonstrate five elements to make an interception claim under the ECPA. A
plaintiff must show: "that a defendant (1) intentionally; (2) intercepted,
endeavored to intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept; (3) the contents of; (4) an electronic communication; (5) using a
device." Id. at 18.157 id.
158 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462
(5th Cir. 1994).
159 United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
language may be out of step with the technological realities of computer crimes
... it is not the province of this court to graft meaning onto the statute where
Congress has spoken plainly."). The First Circuit stated it is the province of
Congress to amend the Wiretap Act to extend to electronic communications the
protections the Act affords wire and oral communications.
160 Since Councilman, the House of Representatives has introduced bills that
would extend the protection of the Wiretap Act to electronic communication in
electronic storage. On July 22, 2004, Representatives Inslee, Bartlett, Flake, and
Delahunt introduced the E-mail Privacy Act of 2004, H.R. 4956, 108th Cong.
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reflect, on whether it seems justifiable for electronic
communications that are simultaneously "in transit" and "in
storage" to come under the protections of either the Wiretap Act or
the SCA or to fall outside of the protections of both? When asking
this question, courts should keep in mind that the purpose of the
ECPA is to expand privacy protections, previously applicable to
only wire and oral communications, to include electronic
communications.
If courts allow electronic communications that are
simultaneously in transit and in storage to be acquired by ISPs
without consequence, they are essentially reverting to the
protections afforded electronic communications prior to the
enactment of the ECPA-none. The First Circuit's narrow
interpretation of the Wiretap Act in Councilman limits the privacy
afforded electronic communications and disregards societal
expectations of privacy.' 61 It is highly unlikely that Congress
intended such a result.
(2004), which would extend the protection of the Wiretap Act to electronic
communications in electronic storage. Jay Inslee, Protecting Your Privacy, at
http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/privacy/tech_email.html (July 22, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Another bill, H.R.
4977, was also introduced in 2004. Both bills, H.R. 4956 and 4977 have been
introduced to the Committee on the Judiciary. In addition, on September 9,
2004, Representative Sherman introduced a bill, H.R. 5059, co-sponsored by
Representatives Case and Etheridge that would effectively reverse Councilman.
H.R. 5059 does not rewrite the Wiretap Act or the USA PATRIOT Act; it
instead treats email as stored communication and removes the statutory
provision that allows ISPs to monitor the content of stored communications.
Under this bill, an ISP can only read email in response to a law enforcement
request such as a court order.
161 Since one of the canons of statutory construction provides that courts should
find a rational basis interpretation, the First Circuit should take the sure step of
deciding that the undelivered email in Councilman was in fact "predominantly
in" transit and intercepted as proscribed by the Wiretap Act.
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